Urban Representation Through Deliberation: A Theory and Test of Deliberative Democracy at the Local Level

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Abstract:

Despite the enormous size of the urban population, political scientists have very little knowledge of the capacity for substantive representation in large cities. This article develops and tests models of urban representation based on the deliberative democracy theoretical framework. Focusing on school districts in Los Angeles County, this article uses a unique survey of superintendents of 52 school districts from within the largest county in the United States to develop a comparative index measure of deliberative democracy. The results from this article show that urban deliberative democracy is strongly correlated with increased political knowledge, high levels of minority political empowerment, and low levels of racial conflict. Furthermore, deliberative democracy is significantly correlated with greater concern towards policy issues prioritized by the school districts. These findings suggest the importance of promoting deliberative practices in urban, multi-racial/multi-ethnic environments.

Keywords: urban politics, school governance, representation, deliberative democracy

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America is a nation of urban enclaves. Today, over 80 percent of the 320 million people in the United States live in large cities.[1] For much of the past half century, urbanization largely resulted in residents settling into suburbs (Frasure-Yokley 2015). However, the most recent trend has led to an increase in population size within dense urban spaces spearheaded by the migration of both young adults[2] and retirees.[3] Along with this new group of migrants, large cities also still have a high concentration of racial and ethnic minorities amongst its large population.[4] Thus, cities are not only growing again but, they are also becoming more racially and ethnically diverse. By boasting large populations of people from a range of cultural backgrounds who have significantly different economic and political needs, urban residents should, in theory, be extremely interested in pushing for democratic accountability from their local representatives. Despite the sociopolitical arrangement of large cities, political scientists have paid very little recent attention to how political representation operates in these environments. As a result, the political science scholarship lacks a systematic analysis of how democratic accountability functions in large cities.

Nowhere is the absence more apparent than with respect to substantive representation. In this article, I deploy the Pitkin (1967) definition of substantive representation: "having a representative with congruent policy views acting as an

[1] "2010 Census Urban Area Facts" *U.S. Census*. http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafacts.html
[2] See, "A Growth Revival?". William Frey. *Brookings Institute*. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/a-big-city-growth-revival/
[3] See. "Young Adult Migration: 2007-2009 to 2012-2012." Megan J. Benetsky, Charlynn A. Burd, and Melanie A. Rapino. *United States Census Bureau*. https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2015/acs/acs-31.html
[4] See. "Minorities Lead Growth in Biggest Cities." Sabrina Tavernise. *New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/us/31census.html

advocate." Every day, thousands of local actors – such as: mayors, city council members, school board members, and a host of other officials – make decisions that impact their constituents and their communities. Although these decisions impact the majority of Americans, political scientists have little understanding of how well local views are represented. Among the voluminous literature on representation, the vast majority of articles and books have concentrated on members of Congress.[5] Of the relatively smaller body of literature on representation in large cities, most studies have focused on local elections without much analysis on how much substantive representation exists beyond casting ballots (Berry and Howell 2007; Green et al. 2003).

Substantive representation has also gained little prominence in the field of urban politics. Beyond research on political machines and ethnic coalitions in large cities (Erie and Kogan 2016; Jones-Correa 2001), previous studies of urban politics have primarily relegated representation to descriptive identity-based politics (Hajnal 2010). Meanwhile, the most prominent studies of local politics have largely focused on governance in large cities, whether through elite-driven politics (Dahl 1961; Stone 1989), municipal competition (Peterson 1981), symbolic representation through minority empowerment (Browning et al. 1997; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Bobo and Gilliam 1990), or political ideology (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010) with little to say about substantive representation. Recent studies of local politics in suburbs suggest that accountability at the local level is possible, but the evidence is relegated to municipalities where the scope is small and the actors are interdependent (Oliver 2001; Frasure-Yokley 2015).

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[5] Berry and Howell (2007) estimate that 94% of articles published between 1980 and2000 in the top-5 ranked political science journals focused on presidential, congressional, or gubernatorial elections.

Looking to explain how democracy works within dense and diverse populations, this article develops and tests a new theory of representation in large cities – a theory based on democratic deliberation. After reviewing the literature on both representation and local governance, I question whether prevalent models of representation will be germane to large cities, and this article theorizes on how substantive representation at the local level should be a function of both the level of democratic discourse and the state of race relations within a community. Contrary to popular stereotypes and commonly held misconceptions, this article finds that local officials in large cities formulate policy concerns and priorities that are representative of the policy interests of their communities, but they do so in accordance with the level of democratic deliberation taking place in the community. Yet, the extent to which communities engage in democratic deliberation depends on citizens' political interest as well as race relations throughout the area. From these findings, perspectives on large city politics and democratic representation are refined.

Representation in Large cities

Most of our knowledge about the way elected officials represent their constituents comes from the vast body of literature on congressional voting behavior. Scholars have explained congressional responsiveness by largely relying on three factors: partisanship, constituency contact, and electoral incentives (Miller and Stokes 1963; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1992; Tate 2003; Grose 2011; Grimmer 2013). There are many reasons, however, to question whether this robust model of government decision-making at the national level is applicable for large cities in the United States. First, issues at the local level are more specific and idiosyncratic than large-scale national policies, which

disrupt the strength of political party cues (Oliver and Ha 2007). Second, due to high population density, large cities provide a major challenge for contact between elected officials and their constituents. Lastly, urban spaces tend to produce elections that are less competitive than national contests for office seats with less prestige than federal positions (Oliver 2012 et. al). Without strong parties, opportunities for widespread contact, and significant electoral competition, large city governance – policymaking in cities with populations greater than 50,000 people[6] – is positioned to function much differently than congressional districts.

The limited research on representation at the municipal level suggests that local officials are largely unresponsive to their constituents. Scholars tend to highlight institutional constraints when attempting to explain a lack of representation at the local level (Peterson 1981; Craw 2010; Hajnal and Troustine 2010; Trounstine 2010). These studies point to the intergovernmental nature of policy at the local level; often the federal and state governments impose restrictions on how much control local officials have over their jurisdictions (Wong 1988; Peterson 1995). Along with institutional barriers, studies also show that political fragmentation constrains local officials as well. This issue of political fragmentation is particularly salient for urban school governance. Scholars show that democratic responsive can be comprised into the asserted interests of a variety of actors such as: teachers unions (Moe 2011), business leaders (Stone et al. 2001), and urban school reformers (Hess 2011; Hess 1999). Municipal officials have room to be

[6] According to the Census, cities with populations greater than 50,000 people are considered urban areas. See: https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html.

unresponsive, these studies assume, due to a tendency of local residents to demonstrate low levels of political interest and participation.

A variety of studies have found competing evidence that local residents are indeed informed enough to evaluate their local officials. Arceneaux (2004) finds that citizens are able to delineate between local and other levels of government when assigning policy responsibility to elected officials. Tausanovitch and Warsaw (2014) suggest that city residents select officials that match and respond to their ideological preferences, although the relationship weakens for large cities. However, other scholarship reveals indications of representation occurring in large cities. Howell and Perry (2004) demonstrate that urban city residents do formulate approval ratings of mayors in accordance with indicators of mayoral performance. Also, Stein, Ulbig, and Post (2005) show that approval ratings strongly predict candidate support in large city mayoral elections. Taken as a whole, the studies of local citizen attitudes and behavior suggest that large city dwellers have the capacity to inform themselves about politics at the local level. Demonstrating this ability is important because it suggests that the residents of large cities also have the ability to be active and engaged in policy discussions taking place in their communities. The next section presents a framework of how informed urban residents go about demanding accountability.

Urban Democracy Through Discourse

The literature on large cities largely ignores the possibility that effective substantive representation can occur. This article questions that omission by arguing that a reexamination of representation through the lens of democratic deliberation can produce evidence of responsiveness in a large city. Deliberative democracy is a framework

suggesting that discourses between members of the public and their elected officials is central to representative decision-making (Habermas 1984; Gutmann & Thomopson 2009; Fishkin 1991). This form of representation differs from the more common conceptualization of aggregating the preferences of individuals. Instead of simple majority-rule, deliberative democracy relies on the open exchange of information between individuals and, ultimately, persuasion resulting from the information exchange. Since discourse and persuasion lie at the core of the framework, institutions must provide opportunities for members of the public to deliberate with their representatives. Institutions also require that representatives justify final decisions to the public.

There are six principles identified in the literature that indicate if a governing institution utilizes a deliberative model of democratic representation. Theorists suggest that deliberation begins with *initial disagreement* on a policy issue amongst members of the public and their representatives (Habermas 1984;Gutmann and Thompson 1999). This disagreement should take place between a representatively *diverse* group of participants (Fishkin 1997; Mansbridge 1983), who all agree to pursue the *common good* of the public as opposed to individual or group interests (Benhabib 1996; Chambers 1996; Chambers 2003; Barber 2003). Members of the public must agree to *exchange information* regarding the policy issue of discussion (Gastil 2000; Lindeman 2002). Representatives should then reach *collective decision* made in partnership with members of the public through collective reasoning (Habermas 1984; Cohen 1989). Lastly, the representatives must *justify* the final decision back to the public (Gutmann and Thompson 2009; Dryzek 2000). These six principles – *initial disagreement, diversity, pursuit of the common good, information*

exchange, collective decision-making, and justification – should surface in any space committed to governing through deliberative democracy.

Based on the six identified principles, I develop the first comparative measure of deliberative democracy to be applied to local political institutions in the United States. This approach, however, builds upon previous attempts to study deliberative democracy empirically. Specifically, this project deploys a similar strategy as Steiner (2004), who develops a comparative index. However, while Steiner evaluated specific discourse in three parliamentary houses, my index measures overall perceptions of discourse in school board meetings by officials who attend the vast majority of the meetings. I also buttress this study on the previous work that has taken a case-study approach to studying deliberative democracy in school boards (Asen 2015; Asen et al. 2013; Tracy 2011). The case studies provide confidence that there is indeed a conceptual link between deliberation and representation worth studying at a larger scale.

Pre Existing Conflict and Empowerment (PECE) Typology

While deliberative democracy serves as an innovative framework for re-conceptualizing urban substantive representation, the theory also has its limitations. Several scholars have in various ways argued that attempts to deliberate could lead to greater disagreement and polarization (Mansbridge 1983; Sander 1997;Sunstein 2002; Mendelberg and Oleske 2000). These scholars remain skeptical of the ability of individuals to turn disagreement into collective decision-making, particularly in environments where people find themselves polarized due to longstanding pre-existing conflict. Scholars have also been critical of the extent to which institutions validate participation from members of

historically marginalized groups in the deliberation process (Mansbridge 1983; Benhabib 1996; Dryzek 2000).

As a result of these limitations, this paper proposes a typology – Pre-Existing Conflict and Empowerment (PECE) – that establishes the theoretical expectations for deliberative democracy when interacting with urban conditions. In other words, PECE typology expects for the effectiveness of deliberative democracy to primarily depend on those two factors: pre-existing [racial] conflict and [minority political] empowerment. The remainder of this section will define both terms within the context of the existing literature before outlining the various expected outcomes emerging from the full typology.

The existing research on urban politics suggests that conflict between different racial groups often determines the political behavior of people and institutions in large cities, whether it results in: the backdoor formulation of regimes (Stone, 1989), racial divisions deciding election outcomes (Kaufmann 2004; Hajnal 2010), or competition for resources (McClain 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier et al. 2004). Therefore, the effectiveness of deliberative democracy should depend on the presence of *pre-existing racial conflict* within an urban space. I rely on a definition of racial conflict consistent with Kaufmann (2004): negative group relations between racial or ethnic groups. I expect for parts of an urban environment that experience high levels of pre-existing racial conflict to be significantly less likely to engage in deliberative practices. Most attempts at public deliberation should result in polarization along racial and ethnic lines.

The effectiveness of urban deliberative democracy should also depend on the extent to which racial and ethnic minorities have access to *political empowerment*. In deploying political empowerment, I rely on the definition developed by Bobo and Gilliam

(1990): “the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision-making.” Bobo and Gilliam, as well as subsequent scholarship, have surfaced the way in which access to political office by minority group leaders, in particular, empowers racial and ethnic minority residents to participate more in urban political affairs (Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Spence and McClerking 2010). More specific to deliberative democracy, Archon Fung (2009) demonstrates the way in which empowering minorities to participate in deliberative practices motivates their overall political engagement. Specifically, Fung shows that empowering minority residents to hold official board or office positions better incorporates them into the deliberation process. Thus, parts of urban areas where the majority of residents lack descriptive representation – or access to official positions – should experience deliberative democracy being either: 1) restricted to the empowered few within the community or 2) non-existent due to the fact that there may be no citizen participation at all.

Figure 1 displays the full theoretical expectations of the PECE Typology. The most optimal conditions for urban deliberative governance should involve high minority empowerment and low pre-existing conflict. Meanwhile, the least optimal conditions are low levels of minority empowerment and high levels of pre-existing conflict. Urban spaces with either high levels of minority empowerment and high pre-existing conflict or low levels of minority empowerment and low pre-existing conflict harbor equally suboptimal conditions for urban deliberative governance. The next section details the hypotheses for the extent to which the proper racial conditions lead to deliberative democracy, which should in turn lead to quality substantive representation.

Hypotheses

Information is arguably the most important aspect of the deliberative democracy framework. The process relies on the exchange of information between citizens and their representatives. Furthermore, existing empirical research has demonstrated deliberation both benefits from having an informed citizenry (Fiskin 1997; Lupia 2009; Mendelberg 2002) and fosters shared learning, which increases the overall information level of the citizenry (Iyengar et al. 2003; Fiskin and Luskin; 2005; Esterling et al. 2011; Warren and Pearse 2008). Thus, democratic deliberations should occur to the extent that the citizenry is interested and informed about politics. As a result, the first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: As residents of a municipality show more interest in and awareness of political issues, school boards will demonstrate a stronger commitment to deliberative democracy.

Along with information, race is also expected to play a significant role in the effectiveness of deliberative democracy. According to the PECE typology, the robustness of deliberative democracy in an urban space should depend on the extent to which urban institutions foster high levels of political empowerment, while also minimalizing racial conflict. As a result, the second and third hypotheses are as follows:

H2: Districts where institutional elites have positive perceptions of race relations will demonstrate a stronger commitment to deliberative democracy.

H3: As local racial and ethnic minority residents gain access to political empowerment, school districts will demonstrate a stronger commitment to deliberative democracy.

Once the parameters that dictate deliberative democracy have been established, the extent to which deliberative democracy leads to substantive representation can be tested. Studies typically test representation by matching the ideology of constituents to either the ideology

of their representative or the ideology of their representative's vote choice. However, relying strictly on ideology can be limiting when citizens' policy preferences do not align well across ideological dimensions. A more optimal method for accessing representation in a large city is through evaluating the priorities and concerns of the representatives.

Theorists continue to debate the expected outcomes for public policy when deliberative democracy is deployed. However, the fact that deliberation makes the policy process more arduous for a local official is less unsettled. Dating back to Schattsneider (1950), political scientists have understood that enlarging the scope of a debate increases the conflict around any given issue. Deliberative democracy involves an increase in informed and engage citizens participating in the policy-making process. The increase of engaged citizens should prompt local officials to show more concern toward the policy-making process. In particular, deliberation should lead officials to be concerned with the difficulty of the policy-process, given the enlarged scope, as well as more concern – in the sense of priority – with policies that fit the needs of the district. Therefore, the final two hypotheses of this article go as follows:

H4: Local officials in spaces with stronger commitments to deliberative democracy should be more likely to see the prospect of implementing policy reform as difficult.

H5: Local officials in spaces with stronger commitments to deliberative democracy should show greater concern towards policies affecting the municipality.

If local officials are not having regular discursive dialogues with their constituents, the policy-making process becomes a function of the interests and concerns of the elected officials. Without deliberation the officials rely on pluralist negotiations with interests or their own ideological beliefs. Under these conditions, substantive representation only occurs to the extent that the goals of narrow interest groups or ideological beliefs of public

officials embody the concerns of the members of the public. Deliberative democracy, therefore, should mark a pathway to effective substantive representation.

Research Design

To test these hypotheses, this article examines a multiplicity of school districts within the second largest metropolitan area in the United States: Los Angeles County.[7] I utilize data from the Los Angeles Region Leaders Survey (LARLS) project. LARLS has produced a survey of school board superintendents serving school districts throughout Los Angeles County. The survey was administered in partnership with Loyola Marymount University's Center for the Study of Los Angeles. We contacted the superintendents of all 80 school districts within Los Angeles County and 52 (65%) agreed to participate in the face-to-face surveys and interviews, which we conducted during the 2015-16 academic school year. We included six questions in the survey instrument that ask superintendents about the practice of deliberative democracy in their districts. This survey is one of the first of its kind to ask such questions to local officials. Given the procedural nature of deliberative democracy, we felt it important to ask about the different principles of deliberative democracy that theorists emphasize: willingness to exchange information, diversity in backgrounds amongst participants, willingness to pursue common interests or the public good, collective decision-making, and justification.[8]

Table 1 displays the specific wording from the survey as well as the distribution of responses. As the table shows, there is consistent variation in superintendents' perceptions

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[7] American Fact Finder. *US Census*. http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 2015.

[8] The survey did not ask superintendents about initial disagreement because we assume that disagreement is inevitable in any governance setting.

of democratic deliberation in their districts. Furthermore, Figure 2 displays the results of a factor analysis of the six deliberation measures, which maps the combined variation of all six measures onto four possible dimensions of variation. One can see the majority of the arrows converge in the same two planes, which indicates that the variables follow similar variation patterns; the variation mainly falls along two dimensions. Therefore, statistically, the individual deliberative democracy measures fit well together as components of an index. As a result, an additive index measure of deliberative democracy is compiled based on each district superintendent's responses to the six deliberative democracy questions. Each "always" response is codes as a 3, and the "usually" responses are coded as a 2. Meanwhile, the "sometimes" responses are coded as 1, and "never" responses are coded as zeros. The additive index that the responses from all six of the deliberative democracy questions are combined into ranges from 0 to 18, and the full index forms what I call the Deliberative Democracy Index Scale (DDIS).

In theorizing about how deliberative democracy should function at the local level, this article describes the PECE typology in which deliberation depends on a high level of political empowerment as well as a low level of racial conflict. In order to test this theory, LARLS included measures of both concepts. We measure racial conflict by asking superintendents, "How would you rate the race relations of your district compared to other districts in Los Angeles County?" Respondents are given the choices: better, about the same, or worse. I also create the measure of political empowerment by matching the race or ethnic background of the superintendent to the racial composition of the school district. Specifically, I measure the extent to which the racial or ethnic group of the superintendent comprises more of the district population than that group's median size across Los Angeles

County. This article is especially interested in political empowerment amongst racial and ethnic minorities. Therefore, I create a separate measure of minority political empowerment that only factors districts with minority superintendents and above-median minority student populations.[9] For example, districts that have an African-American superintendent as well as an African-American student population larger than the median African-American student population for the county are indicated as minority political empowerment districts. This same process is performed for Latinx and Asian-American superintendents and student populations. Mathematically, the logic of the variable functions as described in following equation if we refer to empowerment as E and descriptive representation as R:

$$E = 1, if\ R > 1$$

$$R = \delta_1 Minority\ Official + (\ Median[Group\ Population_{District}] - Median\ [Group\ Population_{County}])$$

The expectation is that superintendents who perceive the most evidence of deliberative democracy in their districts will also perceive positive race relations, and there should also be high levels of minority political empowerment in their districts as well.

Along with testing the theoretical application of deliberative democracy to local politics, this article is also interested in the relationship between local officials' perceptions of democratic deliberation and the goals and priorities that local officials formulate. In order to approach the latter, our survey also includes questions that assess

[9] This method of measuring political empowerment and minority political empowerment is consistent with the existing literature. See: (Bobo and Gilliam 1990); (Gilliam 1996); (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998); (Spence and McClerking 2010). Regular political empowerment factors in districts with both white superintendents and larger than median populations, while minority political empowerment excludes those districts.

superintendents' policy-related goals, priorities, and concerns in four areas: 1) creating new policy, 2) labor costs, 3) multilingual education, and 4) special education. The specific question wordings and variable coding are listed in the Appendix 1. Each question involves a policy area within public education in California that should have direct implications for the students in each of the districts represented. School finance is typically a primary issue of concern for all districts throughout the United States. By having a large number of non-native English speakers, the issue of multilingual education is a highly salient issue in California. Lastly, the California Department of Education lists special education as a top priority for public schooling in the state.[10] While the state generates a baseline incentive for superintendents to care about these policy issues, the districts that engage in deliberation should show an increased concern due to the pressure and input from residents of the district. Along with questions about deliberative democracy and policy-related concerns, we also collect personal information about the superintendents that the literature suggests may also factor into their decision-making. The data includes information on each superintendent's: racial identification, gender identification, age, partisan affiliation, political ideology, experience, and salary.

The dataset for this article also features district-level aggregate data merged with the survey responses. This aggregate-level data shows that the within the largest county in the United States there is significant variation across the school districts. For instance, the enrollment sizes of the school districts, which are the primary indicators of population, range from the over 646,000 students within the Los Angeles Unified School District to the

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[10] For policy and program priorities of the Los Angeles County Office of Education See "Specialized Programs: Responds to the Unique Needs of California's Diverse Students." http://www.cde.ca.gov/sp/.

223 students of the Hughes-Elizabeth Lakes Union School District. In terms of racial demographics, the districts served by the superintendents in the sample feature high concentrations of racial and ethnic groups: White populations as high as 76%, African-American populations as high as 40%, Latinx populations as high as 98%, and Asian-American populations as high as 51%. However, the sample also includes superintendents of districts where no racial or ethnic group comprises a majority. In terms of socioeconomics, the districts also vary with respect to the percentage of students eligible or "Free or Reduced Lunch," ranging from 2% to 96%. While these municipal institutions all comprise a part of a major urban area, they differ significantly in regards to their demographic and socioeconomic composition. This article will demonstrate that, despite ecological differences, the extent to which local officials perceive democratic deliberation is associated with how local officials both assess and take concern with policy issues.

This project examines school districts and superintendents due to their optimal utility. By focusing on school districts, the scope of public policy at the local level narrows. While issues such as land use and road maintenance may not resonate with the level of knowledge or political interest of the typical urban resident, public education tends to be one of the most prioritized issues at the local level, and at the school district level only public education issues enter the discussion. Superintendents are the ideal actors through which to assess deliberation in a school district because they are appointed officials. As appointed officials, they have a much weaker incentive than school board members – who are elected – to inaccurately assess citizen participation in their district. The only problem with relying on superintendents is that appointed local officials are less responsive to constituents than elected officials (Sances 2016). However, because superintendents are

not institutionally positioned to be responsive, any evidence of representation actually better validates the framework because public responsiveness would come despite there being an electoral incentive to do so.

Because this investigation examines the politics around school boards, control measures that account for existing theories of school governance are also factored into the dataset. Stone et al. (2001) suggest that the relationship between local officials and the business community influence school district policymaking. Moe (2011) argues that the organizational capacity of teachers' unions best dictates policy decisions. Also included are controls for factors idiosyncratic to the superintendents: nativity (from Los Angeles or not), years of experience on the current job, and the salaries afforded to the superintendents by the districts. I deploy these professional factors in order to levy the influence of superintendents' leadership style and ideology, which other scholarship has shown to be important (Hess 2003; 2012).

The school districts included in the dataset amount to a sample size more than representative of the districts in Los Angeles County. However, because the sample size (n=52) leaves limited statistical power for a multivariate analysis, this article utilizes a dataset generated by sampling with replacement from the original dataset a total of 250 times.[11] I limit the bootstrap sampling to 250 because, according to the National Center of Education Statistics, there are slightly more than 250 school districts (approximately 266)

[11] Sampling without replacement allows the sample size to be enlarged, while allowing each observation within the larger sample to remain independent of one another. Thus, each of the simulated districts had the probability of being selected into the larger sample. For use of sampling with replacement in previous political science research see: Mueller et al. 1972; Lewis & Poole 2004; Ashworth & Clinton 2007.

in the United States with at least 25,000 students.[12] Because this article is concerned with districts in large cities, increasing the sample to 250 makes the size of the sample in the study comparable, solely in the context of size, to a more generalizable study of urban school districts in the United States. The use of random sampling also enables this article to analyze the information from the original dataset but with significantly greater statistical power added to the multivariate estimations. The random sampling had largely no effect on the direction or size of the statistical relationships measured in this analysis (See Appendix 3 for summary statistics of the original sample versus the bootstrap sample). Increasing the sample size mainly reduced the error or random noise preventing the measurements from establishing estimates with statistically significant confidence levels.

Determinants of Urban Deliberative Democracy

In order to understand the potential role of deliberative democracy in shaping the behavior of local officials, it is important first to identify any systematic differences in the nature of deliberation-based democratic discourse across governing bodies. One of the primary purposes of deliberative democracy at its most efficient state is to generate more information around any given policy issue up for discussion. As a result, this article offered H1, which expects a positive statistical relationship between deliberative democracy and the level at which citizens are informed about policy. The results of the test of the first hypothesis are displayed in the first column of Table 2 (Model 2A). The data estimations confirm the first hypothesis. Superintendents' perception of their district residents' awareness of education policy issues – the Local Control Funding Formula, Common Core,

[12] See, "Characteristics of the 100 Largest Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts in the United States: 1999-2000."
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/100_largest/discussion.asp

and Smarter Balance Assessment[13] – is a statistically significant correlate with districts' deliberative democracy index scores. Specifically, with regard to political awareness, per every one-unit shift upward in district residents' awareness scale score, districts' deliberative democracy index scores increase by an average of 0.5 units. As expected, the districts that seem to be more committed to the practice of democratic deliberation also seem to have a more politically aware population.

The PECE Typology predicts that racial factors, particularly racial conflict will disrupt the ability of deliberative democracy to take place in a local political space. Hypothesis 2, therefore, predicts that deliberative democracy will decrease as racial conflict increases. The estimates from Model 2B, which are shown on Table 2, provides the results of the test of Hypothesis 2, and the data, once again confirms the hypothesis. The data shows a strong positive relationship between [positive] race relations and deliberation, which suggests that deliberation has a strong negative association with poor race relations. Per every unit increase in positive race relations, districts' deliberative democracy scores also increase by an estimated 2.1 points, which makes race relations, statistically, the strongest correlate across all four models. Thus, the estimates suggest that the extent to which pre-existing racial conflict filters into the discourse at school board meetings has a significant impact on the capacity for deliberative discourse at those meetings.

While deliberative democracy increases in accordance with positive relations (or decreases as pre-existing racial conflict increases), superintendents' perception of

[13] Awareness is measured by superintendents' perception of how well informed residents of their districts are about the three separate policy issues. Their perceptions of each are combined into a single additive scale.

democratic discourse in the district should also be a function of political empowerment as well (See H3.). The results from Model 2C on Table 2 shows the results of adding political empowerment to the statistical model estimating differences in deliberation. As the estimations indicate, the data also confirm the second hypothesis; deliberative democracy scores increase in accordance with political empowerment. Model 2D substitutes overall political empowerment for minority political empowerment, and the results indicate that minority political empowerment shares a positive statistically significant relationship with the deliberative democracy index as well. While political empowerment measures all districts in which the race of the superintendent matches the identity of a racial group with a population larger than the county median, minority political empowerment narrows to only designate districts where empowerment is only in place for racial and ethnic minorities. Simply put, minority empowerment excludes majority white empowerment districts. The results indicate that districts with more politically empowered residents boast deliberative democracy index scores an estimated 1.2 points higher than non-empowerment districts. Similarly, minority political empowerment districts have deliberation index scores an estimated almost 2 points higher than non-minority political empowerment districts. The last column on Table 2, Model 2E, measures all four independent measures – awareness, empowerment, minority empowerment, and race relations – together, and one can see that race relations and awareness remain significantly related to school districts' commitment to deliberative democracy.

As a whole, the estimations from the models on Table 2 support the theoretical expectations established in the PECE Typology. Urban school districts with strong commitments to deliberative democracy experience, on average, lower levels of pre-

existing conflict as well as high levels of minority political empowerment. The models show other patterns as well. High deliberative democracy districts tend to be both smaller in size and have positive rapport with teachers' unions. Deliberative democracy scores also appear to differ based on some of the characteristics of the superintendent evaluating the deliberation such as: whether or not the superintendent is from Los Angeles, his or her political ideology, whether or not he or she has advanced degrees, his or her age, and his or her level of experience. However, even when controlling for these district-level factors and idiosyncrasies of the superintendents themselves, it becomes clear that racial conflict and minority empowerment are strongly associated with effective deliberative democracy in the urban districts analyzed for this study. Furthermore, it is also evident that, between the two PECE Typology factors, mitigating pre-existing racial conflict appears to be what is most statistically related to a strong district-level commitment to deliberative democracy. The question now becomes, to what extent is that commitment to deliberative democracy – or lack thereof – related to the policy process or policy prioritization in the school districts?

Urban Deliberative Democracy and Policy-Based Representation

How does a governing body's use of democratic discourse translate into substantive representation? In order for deliberation to motivate responsiveness, democratic discourse should influence how local officials evaluate or assess the state of policy efforts in their districts. In theory, democratic deliberation should surface the policy-related concerns, issues, and priorities harbored by members of the community. Therefore, the local officials who are responsible for implementing policy should demonstrate a greater concern towards – or a higher priority placed on – policy important to their districts as their districts become more democratic. For school districts, the superintendents are the lead

bureaucrats charged with the task of implementing policies signed into law by the school board. Superintendents also utilize their own discretion in implementing initiatives that are not explicitly stated by the school board. In order for discourse to lead to representation, there should be a relationship between the level of democratic discourse in the district and superintendents' assessment of policy in their district. Specifically, since deliberation should serve as a tool for enforcing accountability, democratic discourse should prompt superintendents to show a greater concern towards policy issues that are important to the district.

In order to test this relationship, this article examines three policy areas that the California Department of Education (CADOE) has designated as primary issues: school district finance, language instruction, and special education. Due to the emphasis from the CADOE, every district in the original dataset has the incentive to address the three issue areas. Along with the incentive from the state, the issues themselves are central to administering quality public education in any district in Southern California. Thus, the extent to which local officials address these issues speaks to the extent to which they represent the interests of local residents as defined by the state of California and a general understanding of quality public education.

Table 3 shows the results from the statistical models estimating the relationship between democratic deliberation and administrative elites' policy concerns. Models 3A and 3B examine the issue of school finance. Specifically, they measure which superintendents would be more likely to cite "creating new policy" or "labor costs" as the top financial concerns facing their districts. According to the models, superintendents' concern with these two specific areas of school district finance increase in accordance with

the level of democratic deliberation they observe in their districts. In terms of specific estimations, superintendents' concern with implementing new policy grows by 0.02 standardized units for every one-unit increase in a district's deliberative democracy score. Similarly, concern with labor costs also increases by an estimated 0.54 standardized units per unit increase in a district's deliberative democracy score. These estimations are statistically significant at the 95% and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Thus, the results reveal that the extent to which districts practice deliberative democracy is positively related to the extent to which superintendents see crucial fiscal policy issues as major concerns.

Language instruction and special education are two policy issues within the broader scope of curriculum, which is an area where school boards hold the most discretion. The questions posed to superintendents regarding special education and language instruction, particularly multilingual education, ask them to evaluate their district's performance in these two policy areas. Model 3C shows the estimates for which superintendents are more likely to say that multilingual education will have a positive impact on their districts. The results indicate that, even when controlling for the percentage of students in the district who are considered English Language Learners (arguably the primary beneficiaries of a multilingual education program) democratic deliberation still experiences a statistically significant relationship with superintendents' attitudes toward multilingual education. However, that relationship is negative, which indicates that the more democratic school districts are also the districts where superintendents do not see multilingual education having a positive impact. Specifically, superintendents are 0.029 standardized units less likely to see multilingual education as having a positive influence per unit increase in their

district's deliberative democracy score. This relationship is, once again, statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Substantively, Model 3C suggests that more deliberative democracy is actually associated with more negative evaluations from superintendents regarding the impact of multilingual education in their districts.

Model 3E displays the results from modeling the extent to which superintendents feel that their districts are prepared to meet the needs of students with special needs. Once again, the deliberative democracy index measure produces a statistically significant correlation with the policy issue, although this time only at the 90% confidence level. Superintendents' confidence in their district's ability to administer education for students with special needs increases 0.022 standardized units on average per unit increase in a district's deliberative democracy index score. Thus, the data suggests that, even when controlling for the combined population of the most vulnerable students that tend to require special needs – students living in poverty, English Language Learners, and foster youth – deliberative democracy is still associated with the way superintendents perceive their districts ability to work with students facing unique challenges.

As a whole, the models on Table 3 provide evidence that superintendents' perception of how much democratic discourse takes place in the district links directly to the extent to which superintendents take concern with or evaluate public policy in their districts. These showings of concern and the evaluations are not necessarily positive. In fact, the concerns with school finance indicate that superintendents may see policy as a more difficult feat in parts of an urban area where local officials have to engage in conversations with constituents and justify the decisions they make. The negative evaluations of the effectiveness of multilingual education could also speak to conflict

between public discourse and making policy; while the public may want it, multilingual education could come at a startup cost that initially lowers initial student performance and places superintendents' jobs at risk. As a result, superintendents' show of concern, even when expressed through a recognition of difficulty, suggests that democratic deliberation does seem to position local officials in a major urban area to approach their job with the expectation that they will be held accountable for the final decisions that become policy in the school districts.

Conclusion

Taken together, this article provides a foundational picture of deliberative democracy and substantive representation in a large urban area. This article has argued that regularly occurring democratic discourse in a large city leads to greater substantive representation. It has been demonstrated that deliberative democracy is a theoretical framework that can be applied to the study of urban politics. The first analysis of this article provides evidence that deliberative democracy functions best when local residents: show an interest in political issues, display high levels of political empowerment, and live under low levels of racial conflict. In Los Angeles – a large city with tremendous racial diversity but also a history of both racial tension and racial segregation – the data show that once racial factors enter the equation, deliberative democracy breaks down. On a theoretical level, the PECE Typology predicts that such a breakdown will occur, but on a societal level the fact that racial issues hinder democratic discourse suggests that their local officials are not properly representing residents of minority communities. However, the data also suggests that urban deliberative democracy functions best when racial and ethnic minorities are equally represented alongside their White counterparts.

Along with the issues around race, this article also harbors a set of methodological shortcomings that will be addressed in future work. First, I must acknowledge the limitation of the findings due to the small sample size. Future work will extend this study to more districts in order to test the existing model without the need for random sampling techniques. Future work will also extend the scope beyond Los Angeles County and the state of California in order to establish the national generalizability that this study lacks. Lastly, the next study will incorporate surveys of both school board members and members of the public in order to account for the potential bias that may result from relying solely on survey responses from superintendents.

Despite the issues with race and research design, this article contests the growing myth that democratic ability cannot exist in a large city. Existing studies have found evidence of democratic responsiveness in small-to-mid-sized cities. However, large cities remain labeled as undemocratic spaces, and this is in part due to the fact that previous studies that focus on large areas overwhelmingly examine those cities as a single entity. This analysis explores a large urban area as a sum of parts in which residents are located in various communities with their own political institutions with which they can engage. As opposed to comparing local officials in Los Angeles to ones in Chicago or New York, this study compares officials from Santa Monica to administrators in Inglewood. While both scenarios focus on the urban area, the latter comparison has a unique set of strengths. First, comparing communities within an urban area holds fixed larger institutional factors such as the influence of state and county government. Confining the comparison also keeps cultural environments more similar, and like the work that scholars have done on suburbs, the intra-urban-area comparison enables one to measure the role of size and scope in

shaping democratic practices. As the results indicate, the size of the community is also a part of the larger story of democracy in a large city. However, uncovering the full story of how democracy works in a major urban area begins with acknowledging the fact that democracy is possible in these places and theorizing accordingly.

The findings in this article also have implications for education politics. Americans often cite education as one of the top social issues of importance, and as its importance grows education becomes more and more of a political space. Yet, the dialogue around education is too often not a conversation about education as the space to demand democratic accountability (Noguera 2003; 2008). The evidence put forth in this article suggests that to the extent residents of large cities demand democratic accountability, the local officials approach the policy-making process with those demands in mind. In order for the quality of public education to improve, particularly in places with the most vulnerable students, education needs to be discussed as a political space in which engaging in constructive discourse with local officials can be just as –if not more – helpful as volunteering or donating school supplies. Of course, there are racial issues that appear to prevent democratic discourse from taking place in districts with these vulnerable student populations. Thus, the responsibility lies on the school governing institutions themselves to create an environment where they hear the concerns of *all* local residents and justify the decisions they make back to *all* of people in their communities.

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Figure 1: The Pre-Existing Conflict and Empowerment (PECE) Typology



Notes: This typology is a purely theoretical model.

Figure 2: Deliberative Democracy Measure Principal Component Analysis



Source: 2016 Los Angeles Region Leaders Outlook Survey

Table 1: Factors Comprising the Deliberative Democracy Measure	
The following questions ask you to reflect on school board meetings in your district:	
Are community members open-minded when considering different viewpoints on a topic?	• Always: 6% • Usually: 58% • Sometimes: 21% • Never: 2%
Are community members interested in pursuing district-wide interests (as opposed to group/individual interests)?	• Always: 17% • Usually: 45% • Sometimes: 34% • Never: 2%
Are board members interested in pursuing district-wide interests (as opposed to group/individual interests)?	• Always: 51% • Usually: 36% • Sometimes: 9% • Never: 2%
Are community members involved in the policy-making process along with district officials?	• Always: 13% • Usually: 38% • Sometimes: 24% • Never: 2%
Once a policy decision is reached, do district officials take time to justify decisions to community members?	• Always: 25% • Usually: 42% • Sometimes: 28% • Never: 4%
Does a demographically-diverse representation of individuals provide input at board meetings (as opposed to a homogenous group)?	• Always: 15% • Usually: 40% • Sometimes: 30% • Never: 13%
Source: 2016 Los Angeles Region Leaders Outlook Survey **Notes**: Responses were collected from in-person surveys of the superintendents; superintendents completed surveys individually with the interviewer present as a proctor.	

Table 2: Policy Awareness and the PECE Typology as Predictors of Deliberative Democracy					
	Models		Models		
	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
	Awareness Model	Racial Conflict Model	Empowerment Model	Minority Empowerment Model	Awareness + PECE Model
PECE Typology Factors					
Race Relations		2.134***			2.096***
Empowerment			1.215*		-0.609
Minority Empowerment				1.852**	1.248
District-Level Public Awareness of Education Policy Issues					
Awareness Scale	0.487*				0.586**
School Board Relations with Community Institutions					
Business Community	0.682	0.095	0.165	0.165	-0.157
Teachers' Union	2.018**	1.983***	2.870***	2.998***	1.724**
Other District-Level Measures					
Enrollment	-0.009***	-0.007**	-0.009***	-0.010***	-0.007**
Poverty	-0.008	0.002	0.014	0.008	-0.009
Superintendent Characteristics					
Male	-1.082*	-0.952*	-1.049*	-1.300**	-0.631
Native	-0.997*	-0.919*	-1.636***	-1.536***	-0.518
Liberal	0.091	0.014	-0.252	0.043	0.091
Conservative	-2.490**	-0.955	-2.994**	-2.919**	-1.217
Democrat	1.152	1.720**	1.450*	1.160	1.422*
Republican	1.593*	0.894	2.083	2.022**	1.230
Education	-2.126**	-1.881*	-2.188**	-2.733***	-1.699*
Salary	-0.187	-0.137	-0.104	-0.164	-0.329
Experience	1.169***	0.879**	1.148***	1.005***	0.842**
Age	-0.703***	-0.747***	-0.783***	-0.813***	-0.596**
Observations	*250*	*250*	*250*	*250*	*250*
R- squared	*0.324*	*0.373*	*0.319*	*0.335*	*0.406*
***p<0.00; **p<0.01; *p<0.5.					

Source: 2016 Los Angeles Region Leaders Outlook Survey & Ed-Data Education Data Partnership
Notes: Estimates come from models featuring multivariate linear regression modeling. Estimates come from models featuring multivariate linear regression modeling.
Measures of "Poverty" and "Diversity" are aggregate measures from the Ed-Data Education Data Partnership. All other variables come from the superintendent survey responses.

Table 3: Explaining the Policy Evaluations of Superintendents				
		Models		
	3A	3B	3C	3D
	New Policy	Labor Costs	Multilingual Education	Special Education
Deliberative Democracy Index Measure				
Deliberative Democracy	0.020**	0.054***	-0.029**	0.022***
School Board Relations with Community Institutions				
Business Community	0.124	0.210*	0.361***	0.424***
Teachers' Union	0.056	0.079	-0.069	-0.136
Other District-Level Measures				
Enrollment	-0.0000002	0.00002**	-0.000002***	-0.00000009
Poverty	-0.004***	0.004*	0.014***	0.054**
Diversity	-0.007***	0.079**	0.004*	0.012
Superintendent Characteristics				
Male	0.095	0.111	-0.040	0.132
Native	0.041	-0.152	-0.165*	-0.135
Liberal	-0.071	-0.025	0.174*	-0.220*
Conservative	0.233*	-0.584***	-0.290*	0.224
Democrat	-0.102	-0.044	0.111	0.028
Republican	-0.027	-0.004	0.316**	-0.091
Education	0.152	0.209	-0.517***	-0.042
Salary	0.071***	-0.068*	0.005	-0.046
Experience	-0.099**	-0.017	-0.125**	0.068
Age	-0.015	0.015	0.035	0.039
Teacher Salaries		-0.004		
ELL			-0.013***	
Poor/ELL/Foster				-0.056***
Observations	*250*	*250*	*250*	*250*
R-Squared	*0.384*	*0.445*	*0.255*	*0.403*

***p<0.00; **p<0.01; *p<0.5.

Source: 2016 Los Angeles Region Leaders Outlook Survey & Ed-Data Education Data Partnership
Notes: Estimates come from models featuring multivariate logistic regression modeling.
Measures of "Poverty", "Diversity", "Teacher Salaries," "ELL," and "Poor/ELL/Foster" are aggregate measures from the Ed-Data Education Data Partnership. . All other variables come from the superintendent survey responses.

Appendix

Appendix 1: Primary Independent and Dependent Measure Question Wording

Independent Variables
Deliberative Democracy Measure 1 (viewpoint exchange)
Are community members open-minded when considering different viewpoints on a topic? Always=3, Usually = 2, Sometimes = 1, Never = 0
Deliberative Democracy Measure 2 (public interest – community)
Are community members interested in pursuing district-wide interests (as opposed to group/individual interests)? Always=3, Usually = 2, Sometimes = 1, Never = 0
Deliberative Democracy Measure 3 (public interest – school board)
Are board members interested in pursuing district-wide interests (as opposed to group/individual interests)? Always=3, Usually = 2, Sometimes = 1, Never = 0
Deliberative Democracy Measure 4 (collective decision-making)
Are community members involved in the policy-making process along with district officials? Always=3, Usually = 2, Sometimes = 1, Never = 0
Deliberative Democracy Measure 5 (mutual justification)
Once a policy decision is reached, do district officials take time to justify decisions to community members? Always=3, Usually = 2, Sometimes = 1, Never = 0
Deliberative Democracy Measure 6 (diversity)
Does a demographically-diverse representation of individuals provide input at board meetings (as opposed to a homogenous group)? Always=3, Usually = 2, Sometimes = 1, Never = 0
Race Relations (Racial Conflict)
"How would you rate the [race relations] of your district compared to other districts in Los Angeles County? Better, About the same, worse. Coded "Better" as 1.
Dependent Variables
New Policy
In your opinion, what is the most significant financial concern schools in your district will face in the upcoming year? (implementing new policies, labor costs, improving infrastructure, energy costs) Implementing new policy = 1, all other responses = 0
Labor Costs
In your opinion, what is the most significant financial concern schools in your district will face in the upcoming year? (implementing new policies, labor costs, improving infrastructure, energy costs) Labor costs = 1, all other responses = 0
Multilingual Education
How would the passage of the California Multilingual Education Act impact your district? (very positive impact, somewhat positive impact, somewhat negative impact, very negative impact) Very positive impact = 1, all other responses = 0
Special Education
To what extent are General Ed teachers in your district prepared to teach students with special needs? (very prepared, mostly prepared, a little prepared, not at all prepared) Very prepared = 1, all other responses = 0

Appendix 2: Superintendent Survey Control Measures Question Wording

Awareness 1
“Do you believe parents in your district are aware of the following changes in [the Local Control Funding Formula]? Very aware, Somewhat aware, Not aware. “ Coded “Very aware” as 1.
Awareness 2
“Do you believe parents in your district are aware of the following changes in [Common Core Standards]? Very aware, Somewhat aware, Not aware. “ Coded “Very aware” as 1.
Awareness 3
“Do you believe parents in your district are aware of the following changes in [Smarter Balance Assessment]? Very aware, Somewhat aware, Not aware. “ Coded “Very aware” as 1.
Business Community
“How would you characterize your relationship as superintendent to [the business community]? Positive relationship, neutral relationship, or negative relationship.” Coded “Positive relationship” as 1.
Teachers’ Unions
“How would you characterize your relationship as superintendent to [unions in your district]? Positive relationship, neutral relationship, or negative relationship.” Coded “Positive relationship” as 1.
Gender
“What is your gender? Male, Female.” Coded “Male” as 1.
Native
“Do you consider yourself an Angeleno?” Yes, No.” Coded “Yes” as 1.
Ideology of Superintendent
“Politically, do you consider yourself to be very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, or very conservative?” Coded “Very liberal” and “ somewhat liberal” as 1 (Liberal). Coded “Moderate” as 1(Moderate). Coded “Somewhat conservative” and “Very conservative” as 1(Conservative).
Party of Superintendent
“At your current address, what is your current voter registration status? Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other party, Not registered.” Coded “Democrat” as 1(Democrat), “Republican” as 1(Republican), “Independent” as 1(Independent), “Not registered” as 1(No party).
Superintendent Education
“What is the last grade or level you completed in school? Elementary(8 or fewer years), Some high school(9 to 11 years), High school graduate(12 years),Technical vocational school, Some college, College graduate, Some graduate school, Graduate, professional, or doctorate degree.” Coded “Graduate, professional, or doctorate degree” as 1.
Salary
“What is your current salary?” Coded as “< 200801” as 1, “> 200800 but < 220501” as 2, “> 220500 but < 242001” as 3, and “> 242000” as 4. (Divided salaries based on quartiles).
Experience
“How long have you been in your current superintendent position? Less than 1 year, 1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 or more years.” Coded “Less than 1 year” as 1, “1 to 5 years” as 2, “6 to 10 years”, “11 to 15 years, and “16 or more years” as 3.
Age
“In what year were you born? Coded “> 1965” as 1, “> 1960 but < 1966” as 2, “> 1954 but < 1961” as 3, and “< 1955” as 4.
Race Relations (Racial Conflict)
“How would you rate the [race relations] of your district compared to other districts in Los Angeles County? Better, About the same, worse. Coded “Better” as 1.
Race of Superintendent
“What ethnic group do you consider yourself a part of or feel closest to? African-American/Black, Asian, Caucasian/White, Latino(a)/Hispanic, Other(open-ended).” Coded “African-American/Black” as 1(Black), “Asian” as (Asian), “Caucasian/White” as 1(White), “Latino(a)/Hispanic” as 1(Latino), and “Other” as 1(Other).

Appendix 3: Superintendent Survey Summary Statistics

	Original Sample		**Bootstrap Sample**		**Both**
Variable	**Mean**(Data)	**SD**(Data)	**Mean**(Sample)	**SD**(Sample)	**Range**
Survey Measures					
Deliberative Democracy	11.192	3.367	11.245	3.380	1,18
Exchange Viewpoints	1.923	0.682	1.975	0.676	0,3
Shared Interest(Community)	1.788	0.750	1.810	0.773	0,3
Shared Interest(Board)	2.385	0.745	2.380	0.706	0,3
Involved Citizens with Policy	1.634	0.742	1.605	0.743	0,3
Mutual Justification	1.885	0.832	1.915	0.819	0,3
Diversity(Deliberation)	1.577	0.915	1.560	0.889	0,3
Awareness	1.115	1.113	1.233	1.141	0,3
Racial Conflict	0.481	0.495	0.485	0.494	0,1
Empowerment	0.712	0.457	0.716	0.452	0,1
Minority Empowerment	0.346	0.480	0.344	0.476	0,1
Business Community	0.808	0.398	0.625	0.405	0,1
Teachers' Unions	0.865	0.345	0.725	0.343	0,1
Male	0.535	0.503	0.525	0.501	0,1
Native	0.596	0.495	0.620	0.487	0,1
Liberal	0.346	0.480	0.370	0.484	0,1
Moderate	0.481	0.505	0.495	0.501	0,1
Conservative	0.077	0.269	0.065	0.247	0,1
Democrat	0.712	0.457	0.755	0.431	0,1
Independent	0.077	0.269	0.080	0.272	0,1
Republican	0.17	0.382	0.130	0.337	0,1
Education (Grad. Degree)	0.865	0.345	0.890	0.314	0,1
Salary	2.500	1.129	2.335	1.144	1,4
Experience	2.096	0.748	2.075	0.715	1,3
Age	2.577	1.126	2.510	1.142	1,4
New Policy	0.135	0.345	0.140	0.348	0,1
Labor Costs	0.500	0.505	0.470	0.500	0,1
Multilingual Education	0.269	0.448	0.285	0.453	0,1
Special Education	0.519	0.505	0.510	0.501	0,1
Aggregate District Measures					
Enrollment	22086.580	88603.730	16233.925	63962.020	223, 646683
Poverty	57.479	29.141	59.061	38.790	2,96
Diversity Index	31.923	16.807	32.285	17.177	2,60
Percent Black	6.335	8.191	6.765	8.696	0,40
Percent White	22.675	23.703	22.043	23.528	0,76
Percent Latinx	57.338	28.346	56.643	28.347	7,98
Percent Asian	8.431	13.049	9.280	14.041	0,65
Average Teacher Salaries	77045.500	7189.446	78429.340	7204.200	66000, 91000
Percent English Language Learners	20.306	13.467	21.541	14.035	1,58
Percent Free Reduced Lunch/ English Language Learners/Foster Youth	61.071	28.762	62.763	28.343	3,98